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INTRODUCTION

More than 400 local governments in the United States have enacted
restrictions or bans on hydraulic fracturing. 1 Over 200 of these ordinances are
in the state of New York.2 Several challenges to these ordinances have been
litigated or are presently in litigation.
The Court of Appeals of New York upheld a local ban on hydraulic
fracturing in late 2013.3 In the most recent decision exploring local authority to
regulate hydraulic fracturing, a trial court in Colorado struck down a local ban,

Associate Professor and Lead Land Use Attorney, West Virginia University College of
Law, Center for Energy and Sustainable Development, Land Use and Sustainable Development
Law Clinic. The author thanks the editors for their thoughtful input on this article. Any errors or
omissions are solely the responsibility of the author.
I
See Local Actions Against Fracking, FOOD & WATER WATCH, http://www.foodandwater
watch.org/water/fracking/fracking-action-center/local-action-documents/ (last visited Oct. 12,
2014).
2
Id.
3
In re Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188 (N.Y. 2014).
*
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finding that the ban was preempted. Similarly, a trial court in West Virginia
struck down a ban on hydraulic fracturing in 2011. 5 On the other hand, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently struck down legislation that, inter alia,
purported to mandate that local governments in Pennsylvania allow hydraulic
fracturing in every zoning classification.6 The statute also required 7statewide
uniformity with respect to zoning restrictions for hydraulic fracturing.
One issue in these disputes revolves around the extent of local
authority to regulate or ban hydraulic fracturing under the land use planning
and zoning power. This Article discusses existing case law and lays out the
likely parameters of this authority, while acknowledging that the authority may
differ from state to state. In addition, this Article lays out a process by which
local governments can adopt enforceable regulations mitigating the community
impacts of hydraulic fracturing. Taking a cue from the Court of Appeals of
New York, this Article does not rehash the debate on the economic and
environmental issues surrounding hydraulic fracturing, instead focusing on
local authority to regulate the practice.
These appeals are not about whether hydrofracking is
beneficial or detrimental to the economy, environment or
energy needs of New York, and we pass no judgment on its
merits. These are major policy questions for the coordinate
branches of government to resolve. The discrete issue before
us, and the only one we resolve today, is whether the state
legislature eliminated the home rule capacity of municipalities
to pass zoning laws that exclude oil, gas and hydrofracking
activities in order to preserve the existing character of their
communities. 8
Even those sympathetic to local government control over hydraulic fracturing
concede that the state also should have significant regulatory control. 9
Although several commentators recognize that local governments hold a role in

Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n v. City of Longmont, No. 13CV63, 2014 WL 3690665 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. July 24, 2014).
5
Ne. Natural Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 1 1-C-411 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12,
2011).
6
Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
4

7

Id. at 915.

In re Wallach, 16 N.E.3d at 1202-03.
See, e.g., Robert H. Freilich & Neil M. Popowitz, Oil and Gas Fracking: State and Federal
Regulation Does Not Preempt Needed Local Government Regulation, 44 URB. LAW. 533 (2012);
John R. Nolon & Steven E. Gavin, Hydrofracking: State Preemption, Local Power, and
Cooperative Governance, 63 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 995 (2013); John R. Nolon & Victoria
Polidoro, Hydrofracking: DisturbancesBoth Geological and Political: Who Decides?, 44 URB.
8

9

LAW. 507 (2012).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol117/iss2/6

2

Richardson: Local Regulation of Hyraulic Fracturing
2014]

LOCAL REGULATION OF HYDRA ULIC FRA CTURING

regulating hydraulic fracturing, and the commentators even list some areas of
control, the details of local control of hydraulic fracturing remain murky."1
This Article fills a void in the legal and planning literature by laying
out explicit parameters for local regulation of hydraulic fracturing that likely
survives attacks that allege preemption. In part, this task is accomplished by
analogizing guidelines set out by courts when interpreting challenges to local
government actions under Section 704 of the Federal Telecommunications
Act.1" Although the focus of Section 704 is to allocate authority between the
federal government, on one hand, and the state and local governments, the
statute lays clear boundaries and the courts have developed a helpful typology
of what actions conform to traditional notions of land use planning and zoning
and, thus, remain within the authority of local governments. This typology can
be applied to regulation of hydraulic fracturing to delineate the boundaries
between state and local authority. In addition, Section 704 of the Federal
Telecommunications Act can provide a model for state legislatures in setting
out the parameters of state versus local control of hydraulic fracturing
activities.
Section II discusses local government regulation of hydraulic fracturing
in general, beginning with a discussion of Dillon's Rule and Home Rule,
concepts that often play a major role in cases that review local control of
hydraulic fracturing. A summary of the local effects of hydraulic fracturing, as
opposed to regional, state-wide, or national effects, follows. The Article then
focuses on the concept of zoning and what zoning generally entails. The focus
then turns to the question of whether a ban or total exclusion of a land use in a
community, falls within the rubric of "zoning."
Section III describes a provision of Section 704 of the Federal
Telecommunications Act of 1996 that attempts to allocate authority between
the federal government, on one hand, and local and state governments on the
other. Use of these provisions as a model for allocating authority between state
and local governments with respect to hydraulic fracturing is examined. Next,
cases from Colorado, New York, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia show the
debate on the allocation of authority between state and local governments as
addressed by those courts. Finally, the Article concludes that local governments
can maintain a significant role in mitigating and compensating for the impacts
of hydraulic fracturing, while the state holds a major role in regulating the
practice of hydraulic fracturing. Enforceable local regulation of hydraulic
fracturing likely falls short of explicit or de facto bans, and doubtless fails to
satisfy many opponents of the practice. However, local regulation of the
impacts of hydraulic fracturing may allow communities to enjoy the benefits of
hydraulic fracturing while limiting the monetary and non-monetary costs.

10 Nolon & Polidoro, supra note 9, at 507.
1 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2013).
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A. Dillon's Rule and Home Rule
The tension between local government authority and state government
authority appears in many court decisions and policies. The Tenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution allocates authority between the state
governments and the federal government, providing that "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
states, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 1 2 Local
governments are not mentioned in the United States Constitution and therefore
must derive their authority from the state.
When courts confront questions of whether local governments possess
authority to enact particular legislation or engage in particular acts, the answer
is not always clear. Courts must resort to a rule of statutory construction. With
respect to local government authority, two possible rules emerged in the mid19th century: Dillon's Rule and Home Rule. Dillon's Rule, named for its author
Judge John Dillon of Iowa, states that:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a
municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following
powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words;
second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the
powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the
accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the
corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any
fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of
power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the
power is denied. 3
Home Rule proves more difficult to define. The Chicago Home Rule
Commission once commented that "[t]here is perhaps no term in the literature
of political science or law which is more susceptible to misconception and
variety of meaning than 'home rule."",14 Many different types of Home Rule
exist, but one definition describes the concept as "the ability of a local
government to act and make policy in all areas that have not been designated to
be of statewide interest through general law, state constitutional provisions, or
initiatives and referenda."' 15 However, the term seems to have taken on a

amend. X.

12

U.S. CONST.

13

1 J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

§ 237 (5th ed.

1911); see also Clark v. City of Des Moines, 19 Iowa 199 (Iowa 1865).
193 (1954).

14

CHICAGO HOME RULE COMM'N, MODERNIZING A CITY GOVERNMENT

is

DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 2 (2001).
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"talismanic aura over the years and often, inaccurately, connotes almost total
freedom of local governments from state control. ' 6
The United States Supreme Court, citing Dillon's Rule, has described
the relationship between the states and their local governments as follows:
[Local governments] are the creatures, mere political
subdivisions of the State, for the purpose of exercising a part of
its powers. They may exert only such powers as are expressly
granted to them, or such as may be necessarily implied from
those granted. What they lawfully do of a public character is
done under the sanction of the state.... They may be created,

or, having been created, their powers may be restricted or
enlarged, or altogether withdrawn at the will of the legislature;
the authority of the Legislature, when restricting or
withdrawing such powers, being subject only to the
fundamental condition that the collective and individual rights
of the people
of the municipality shall not thereby be
7
destroyed.

Judge Dillon went even further, finding that
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their
powers and rights wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into
them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it
creates, so it may destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and
control ....We know of no limitation on this right so far as
the corporations themselves are concerned. They are, so to
phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.' 8
In addition, Dillon's Rule holds sway in most states, with 39 states using
Dillon's Rule in interpreting grants of local government authority, at least for
some types of local governments. 19 Even in those states employing "Home
Rule," which generally presumes that the local government has authority unless
specifically denied by the state, states exert control over local government
authority. Courts typically overturn municipal ordinances if: (1)the ordinance
relates to a "statewide" matter, as opposed to a matter of local concern; (2) the
ordinance conflicts with a state statute; (3) state legislation expressly preempts
the local ordinance; or, (4) state legislation impliedly preempts the local

16

JESSE J. RICHARDSON ET AL., Is HOME RULE THE ANSWER? CLARIFYING THE INFLUENCE OF

http://www.brookings.edu/es/
urban/publications/dillonsrule.pdf.
17
Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 220-21 (1903) (citations omitted).
1s
City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868) (emphasis
DILLON'S RULE ON GROWTH MANAGEMENT 7 (2003), available at

omitted).
19

RICHARDSON,

supra note 16.
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ordinance.2 ° Courts often encounter great difficulty in determining what matters
2
are "statewide" as opposed to those limited to "local concern.", ' "There is no
clear or workable test separating local from state concerns. Courts have
acknowledged that there is considerable overlap in these two categories. 22
Consequently, even with Home Rule jurisdictions, one must first examine
whether the local government holds authority to regulate hydraulic fracturing,
then preemption may be examined. 3
B. State vs. Local Effects of Fracking
Determining whether local regulation of hydraulic fracturing targets
matters of statewide or local concern involves similar difficulties. Traditional
areas of state regulation of oil and gas production include "on-site drilling,
State
[oversight of the] chemicals used ... and [the] production process.'
correlative
regulation also focuses on "prevention of waste, protection of
of oil and gas natural resources, ... safety, [and] onrights,... conservation
25
contamination.,
site
On the other hand, some effects of hydraulic fracturing cause impacts
mainly in a small area around the activity and can be classified as "local."
These local impacts include "noise, light and other visual impacts, 26 road
damage, blasting, dust and traffic.27 In addition, compatibility of the activity to
nearby property uses, impact of the activity on property values in the area,
"adequate off-site infrastructure, services [such as police and fire protection],
affordable housing, and.., the [general] health and safety of the community"
also traditionally form the focus of local regulation.2 8 Odors may also be an

See, e.g., Goodell v. Humboldt Cnty., 575 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa 1998); State v. Hutchinson,
624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980); Charles W. Abdalla & John C. Becker, JurisdictionalBoundaries:
Who Should Make the Rules of the Regulatory Game?, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 7 (1998).
20

21

State ex rel. Haynes v. Bonem, 845 P.2d 150, 155 (N.M. 1992); 2 EUGENE MCQUILLIN,

THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4:28 (3d ed. 2006).
22
1 SANDRA M. STEVENSON, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 21.05

(2d ed. 2014)

(citing Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705 (N.Y. 1929)).
23
Freilich & Popowitz, supra note 9, at 545.
24
Id. at 535.
25

Id. at 543, 547.

26

Alex Ritchie, On Local Fracking Bans: Policy and Preemption in New Mexico 40 (Nov.

25, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=2359773.
San Pedro Mining Corp. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 909 P.2d 754, 759 (N.M. Ct. App.
27
1995); 3 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 18:59 (5th ed. 2014).

28

Freilich & Popowitz, supra note 9, at 535; see also San Pedro Mining Corp., 909 P.2d at

759; Ritchie, supra note 26, at 8, 40, 80.
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Finally, issues such as potential groundwater contamination, methane
emissions, habitat fragmentation, and "degradation of environmentally
sensitive areas" may produce mainly local impacts.30
Some of these "local" impacts could spread and become "statewide."
In addition, states may wish to regulate these impacts to provide uniformity and
certainty. 31 Alternatively, states could promulgate a model ordinance to address
these effects to promote this uniformity and certainty.32 To the extent that local
governments regulate these impacts, setbacks, common in zoning ordinances,
may address many of the issues. 33 Other useful tools that are usually available
to local governments include impact fees 34 and "adequate public facilities
ordinances. 35 Impact fees are a charge imposed on development that seeks to
offset the cost of capital facilities required as a result of land development.3 6
The charges must relate to infrastructure resulting from the development, not
maintenance fees or the like.37 An adequate public facilities ordinance,
implemented in a zoning or subdivision ordinance, conditions development on
a requirement that existing infrastructure can service the planning
development's impact. 38 Local governments implement most of these tools
through a zoning ordinance.
C. Zoning

Many local governments assert the authority to regulate hydraulic
fracturing through zoning ordinances. However, some of these regulations
appear to exceed the scope of what is normally thought of as zoning. "Zoning is
the regulation by the [local government] of the use of land within the
community, and of the buildings and structures which may be located thereon,
in accordance with a general plan and for the purposes set forth in the enabling
statute.

39

The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act was developed by the United

29

3

30

Freilich & Popowitz, supranote 9, at 537-38.

31
32

Ritchie, supra note 26, at 40.
Id. at 89.

33

Id.

34
35

Id. at 41; Freilich & Popowitz, supra note 9, at 534.
Freilich & Popowitz, supra note 9, at 534.

36

2

SALKIN,

supra note 27, § 18:59.

ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF PLANNING AND

ZONING § 15:41 (4th ed. 2005).
37

Id.

38

Michele L. LeFaivre, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Adequate
Public FacilitiesStatutes or Ordinances,123 A.L.R.5th 349, § 2 (2004).
39
1 RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 36, § 1.3.
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States Department of Commerce in 1926 to provide guidance to state
legislatures in enabling local governments to enact zoning ordinances. The
Standard Act is still in use in many states, although it has been supplemented
with other enabling authority. 40 "[T]he kinds of regulations authorized by the
Act still constitute the basic approach to controlling land use. 4 1 Section 1 of
the Standard Zoning Act provides that
[f]or the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the
general welfare of the community, the legislative body of cities
and incorporated villages is hereby empowered to regulate and
restrict the height, number of stories, and size of buildings and
other structures, the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the
size of yards, courts, and other open spaces, the density of
population, the location and use of buildings, structures, and
land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes.42
The Standard Act also sets out the purposes of zoning regulations,
stating that the regulations seek
to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire,
panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the general
welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the
overcrowding of land; to avoid the undue concentration of
population; to facilitate the adequate provision of
transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other
public requirements. Such regulations shall be made with
reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character
of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and
with a view to conserving the value of buildings and
encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout [the
locality] .4
Cases in contexts other than oil and gas provide guidance on what
measures fall within the rubric of zoning and "local concern." Enterprise
Partnersv. County of Perkins,44 considered ordinances that regulated livestock
confinement facilities to minimize odors and flies by requiring that parts of the
facility be covered.4 5 In addition, the ordinance required that "no livestock
40

JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS

DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 4:1 (3d
41
Id.
42

STANDARD

E.

ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND

ed. 2013).

STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT §

1 (Dep't of Commerce 1926) (footnotes

omitted), available at http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingAct 1926.pdf.
43 Id. § 3 (footnotes omitted).
44
619 N.W.2d 464 (Neb. 2000).
45

Id. at 466.
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waste... be carried or washed onto or into county roads, ditches or properties.
. . during . . . a 25-year storm., 46 The court defined "zoning" as "'the process
that a community employs to legally control the use which [sic] may be made
of property and the physical configuration of development upon the tracts of
land located within its jurisdiction. "'4 7 Applying this definition to the
ordinances at hand, the court found that the ordinances constituted "zoning
regulation[s].'48
Similar to the ordinance at issue in Enterprise Partners, a zoning
ordinance may regulate oil and gas production, unless preempted or not
enabled. 49 "As with all zoning ordinances . . . [the] regulations must be
reasonable., 50 Setbacks, traffic controls, erosion and sediment controls, and
bonding requirements generally fall within the scope of "zoning." 51 Where the
activity proposed will be far from residential uses, however, restrictions on oil
and gas activities may be found to be "arbitrary and capricious. 5 2
Another question that arises with respect to zoning ordinances'
treatment of oil and gas production concerns whether a total ban equates to a
"zoning ordinance." This distinction also factors into a determination of
whether the ordinance conflicts with state law. If the state law authorizes the
activity, a ban prohibits a legal activity from occurring within the boundaries of
the locality.
As opposed to a ban, "[m]ost zoning ordinances ... seek[] to separate,
rather than exclude, incompatible uses."5 3 Exclusion of lawful uses raises both
54
a policy question and a legal question as to the validity of the ordinance.
Courts reach different results when examining whether a zoning ordinance may
exclude certain uses. Such reviews are considered on a on a case-by-case
basis. 5
The Supreme Courts of Illinois and Pennsylvania have struck down
such ordinances, regarding outdoor theatres and quarrying respectively. 56 Most
courts appear to place the burden on the local government to show that such a
46

Id.

Id. (quoting Ford v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Converse Cnty., 924 P.2d 91, 94 (Wyo.
1996)).
Id. at 469-70.
48
47

49

3 SALKIN, supra note 27,

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 9:16 (5th ed. 2014).

54

Id.

§ 18.59.

55

DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 5.37 (5th ed. 2003) (citations omitted).
People ex rel. Trust Co. of Chi. v. Vill. of Skokie, 97 N.E.2d 310 (111. 1951); Exton
Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of W. Whitehead Twp., 228 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1967).
56
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ban promotes the general welfare.57 The burden is on the complaining party to
show that the ordinance, although purporting to allow the use, as a practical
matter prohibits the use.58
On the other hand, the New Jersey Supreme Court has allowed the total
exclusion of heavy industrial uses. 59 In re Gernatt Asphalt Products v. Town of
Sardinia60 also allowed a ban of mining activity. The New Jersey and New
York courts, however, appear to be the exception as opposed to the rule.
Perhaps the leading case on local bans of industrial activity is Exton
Quarries,Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of West Whiteland Township. The
Pennsylvania zoning enabling authority was modeled on the Standard State
Enabling Act.6 1 Noting the footnotes to the Standard Act, the court concluded
that the powers granted in the act are "broad and flexible., 62 "[A]lthough
'(z)oning [sic] is a means by which a governmental body
63 can plan for the
future-it may not be used as a means to deny the future.'
The constitutionality of zoning ordinances which totally
prohibit legitimate businesses such as quarrying from an entire
community should be regarded with particular circumspection;
for unlike the constitutionality of most restrictions on property
rights imposed by other ordinances, the constitutionality of
total prohibitions of legitimate businesses cannot be premised
on the fundamental reasonableness of allocating to each type of
activity a particular location in the community. We believe this
is true despite the possible existence outside the municipality
of sites on which the prohibited activity may be conducted,
since it is more probable than not that, as the operator of the
prohibited business is forced to move further from the property
he owns, his economic disadvantage will increase to the point

See, e.g., Koston v. Town of Newburgh, 256 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); Long
Island Lighting Co. v. Vill. of Old Brookville, 72 N.Y.S.2d 718 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 273
A.D. 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948); Nikola v. Twp. of Grand Blanc, 209 N.W.2d 803 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1973), aft'd, 232 N.W.2d 604 (Mich. 1975); Exton, 228 A.2d at 169; Appeal of Olson, 338
A.2d 748 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975); Amerada Hess Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 313 A.2d
787 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
58
Benham v. Bd. of Supervisors of Middletown Twp., 349 A.2d 484 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
Along those lines, the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 bars local or state regulation that
"prohibit[s] or [has] the effect of prohibiting personal wireless services." 47 U.S.C. §
332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) (2013).
59 Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 64 A.2d 347 (N.J. 1949).
60
664 N.E.2d 1226 (N.Y. 1996); see infra Section IV.C.
61 Exton, 228 A.2d at 177.
57

62

Id.

63

Id. at 178 (quoting Nat'l Land & Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Easttown Twp., 215

A.2d 597, 610 (Pa. 1965)).
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of deprivation. Moreover, if one municipality may, with only
moderate justification, totally prohibit an undesired use of land,
it is not unlikely that surrounding municipalities will do the
same-thus increasing the distance to an alternative site and the
concomitant economic disadvantage. Thus the possible
availability of alternative sites somewhere outside the
municipality on which the totally banned business may be
conducted does not make permissible the deprivation within
the township of property rights imposed by a municipalitywide ban of a particular kind of business. For these reasons, we
believe that a zoning ordinance which totally excludes a
particular business from an entire municipality must bear a
more substantial relationship to the public health, safety,
morals and general welfare than an ordinance which merely
64
confines that business to a certain area in the municipality.
The court found that the rationale for the prohibition of mining was not
supported by evidence.65 For example, "[t]he township's assertion that
quarrying will disturb the underground water supply in West Whiteland, though
found as a fact by the Board, is not supported by competent evidence. ' 66 In
addition, some of the dangers complained of could be reduced through zoning
regulations short of prohibition, like a fencing requirement.6 7 The dissenting
opinion labeled the majority as substituting its opinion for that of the zoning
board. "In effect,
this decision has made our Court a zoning board-and a poor
68
that.,
at
one
D. Example of De FactoBan
In addition to the disconnect between zoning and a total exclusion of a
particular use, a ban seems inconsistent with state regulation. Many state
regulations on oil and gas state as purposes the intent to prevent waste and
protect correlative rights. A ban on oil and gas uses within a jurisdiction wastes
oil and gas. 69 A ban also eliminates the correlative rights of the owners within
the targeted area, denying the owner a share in the pool. 70 While federal and

64
65

Id. at 179.
See discussion infra Part III. A section of the Telecommunications Act requires that local

government zoning decisions on the siting of cellular towers be supported by "substantial
evidence." 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (2012).
66

Exton, 228 A.2d at 180.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 187 (Cohen, J., dissenting).
Ritchie, supra note 26, at 81.
Id. at 82.

69
70
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state law may negatively impact correlative rights, where the federal and/or
state government determines that the production is allowed within the
regulations, local law that denies correlative rights should be preempted.7 1
Finally, with respect to hydraulic fracturing, if the oil and gas cannot be
otherwise produced, the ban causes waste. 72 Arguing that state law regulates
"how," but allows 73bans fails to consider "the relationship between waste and
correlative rights.,
Similarly, where an ordinance theoretically allows a lawful activity, but
as practical matter creates so many barriers and discretionary reviews that the
activity is essentially banned, the ordinance should be preempted.7 4 The Santa
Fe County, New Mexico, ordinance provides an example of a de facto ban.75
The 110-page ordinance allows no oil or gas facility "of right" (without
discretionary approvals by the county).76 The county requires the following of
anyone desiring to initiate an oil or gas facility: "an Oil and Gas Overlay
Zoning District Classification; Special Use and Development Permit; Grading
and Building Permits; and a Certificate of Completion. 77
Three distinct processes are required for these approvals.7 8 First, the
overlay classification process involves discretionary administrative and quasijudicial approval. 79 Second, the special use process is quasi-judicial
discretionary. 80 Finally, the grading and building permits and certificate of
completion are obtained through ministerial approvals. 81 Eight different
"detailed studies, plans, reports and assessments" are required, including an
Environmental Impact Report. 82 "If the applicant actually survives the overlay
application stage, he must then enter into one or more development agreements
with the County., 83 This complex gauntlet obviously intends to thwart any
attempts to actually engage in hydraulic fracturing in Santa Fe County.
A federal statute, section 704 of the Federal Telecommunications Act,
anticipates some of the issues that arise when zoning ordinances impact

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id. at 81-82.

74

Id. at 86.

75

See SANTA FE COUNTY, N.M., ORDINANCE 2008-19 (Dec. 10, 2008).

76

Id. §5.

77

Id.

78

Id. §§5,8.

79

Id. §5.

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Id.
Ritchie, supra note 26, at 18.

83
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activities regulated by a higher level of government. That law attempts to
prevent those issues by, inter alia, clearly preempting local action based on
certain effects, requiring substantial evidence to act on applications for cellular
tower siting, and prohibiting bans or effective bans of cellular towers. The next
section describes these provisions and analogizes the measures to possible state
statutes applying to hydraulic fracturing.
Iii. THE FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT AS A MODEL
Federal limitations on the placement of personal wireless service
facilities like cellular towers prove instructive with respect to regulation of oil
and gas extraction, even though these rules lay out ground rules between the
federal government on one hand, and state and local governments on the other.
Federal law lays out relatively clear guidelines for the division of authority and
courts' decisions have further clarified the guidelines. The applicable
provisions of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 may be analogized
to hydraulic fracturing given the fact that both cellular towers (the main target
of the federal act) and hydraulic fracturing are typically opposed by nearby
residents, opposing parties often cite inaccurate information in support of their
positions, 84 and zoning provides the most prominent method of control of both
activities.
Courts have generally upheld "reasonable" local zoning regulation of
cellular towers and personal wireless facilities.85 Typical ordinances regulate
location, placement, installation, fencing, screening, height, and co-location
requirements8 6
The Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 first declares that its
provisions do not limit state or local authority except as provided in the
statute8 7 State or local regulations based on the environmental effects of radio
frequency emissions are prohibited.88 Federal agencies regulate this aspect of
cell phone towers. Local governments may not ban cell phone towers or enact
regulations that have the effect of a ban.8 9 Any decision on the placement of a

84
See, e.g., Stephen J. Eagle, Wireless Telecommunications, InfrastructureSecurity, and the
NIMBY Problem, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 445, 457 (2005); Joshua P. Fershee, Facts, Fiction, and
Perception in Hydraulic Fracturing: Illuminating Act 13 and Robinson Township v.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 116 W. VA. L. REv. 819, 823-24 (2014).
85

4 RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 36, § 79:18.

86

Id.

87

47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) (2013).

88

Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv).

89

Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).
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cell phone tower must be in writing and based on substantial evidence. 90 Such
decision must also be made within a reasonable time. 91
For example, with respect to the substantial evidence requirement,
where a cell tower was denied based on generalized complaints by citizens that
amounted to Not In My Backyard ("NIMBY") concerns, including complaints
that the tower would be "ugly" or that a resident would not want the tower in
his backyard, the finding was not supported by substantial evidence. 9 On the
other hand, where residents and planning department staff voiced concerns that
the cell tower would be twice as high as the surrounding trees and the height
and proximity to residences would diminish the residential character of the
neighborhood, the court found substantial evidence to deny the tower. 93 The
efforts of the provider to mitigate the94 effects by disguising the tower as a bell
tower did not change this conclusion.
Cases interpreting the limitations contained in section 704 of the
Federal Telecommunications Act emphasize the importance of the
comprehensive plan in setting out land use objectives to support regulatory
provisions.9 5 Zoning ordinances may address aesthetic issues, preferences for
locating equipment on existing structures, preferences for concealment of
equipment, and preferred zoning classifications for the location of towers.96 For
example, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals placed great weight on the
Regional Approach to Telecommunications Towers, a document developed by
five different local governments to create a uniform approach to
telecommunication tower siting in the region. 97 The Regional Approach was
incorporated into the defendant county's comprehensive plan and indicated
preferences for colocation, placement on certain types of land and, in certain
zoning districts, types of towers (monopole versus lattice).98
A similar approach by local governments that desire to apply zoning
regulations to hydraulic fracturing activities would increase the chances that the
zoning regulations would be upheld by clarifying the role of the regulations in
the local government's land use plan. In addition, an enabling statute that set

90

Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).

91

Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).

92

T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Charter Twp. of W. Bloomfield, 691 F.3d 794, 800 (6th Cir.

2012).
93
T-Mobile Ne. LLC v. Town ofIslip, 893 F. Supp. 2d 338,360-61 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
94

Id.

95

USCOC of Va. RSA #3, Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 343 F.3d 262 (4th
Cir. 2003); see also Claire B. Levy, Zoning for Cellular Towers Under Current Regulatory
Conditions, 27 COLO. LAW. 75, 75 (1998).
96
Levy, supra note 95, at 75.
97

USCOC, 343 F.3d at 265-66.

98

Id.
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out clear objects for local government regulation and declared certain areas of
regulation as not allowable, like the applicable provisions of the Federal
Telecommunications Act of 1996, would give guidance to local governments in
crafting regulations.
IV. RECENT CASE LAW

A. Introduction
This section discusses four recent state court decisions, three that
considered local regulation of hydraulic fracturing operations, and one that
reviews a challenge to a state statute that limits local regulation of hydraulic
fracturing through zoning. Courts in Colorado and West Virginia struck down
local ordinances that banned hydraulic fracturing. On the other hand, the New
York court upheld a local ban, and the Pennsylvania court, showing great
deference to local authority to engage in land use planning and zoning, struck
down a state statute limiting that local authority. Home Rule authority and state
preemption form part of the consideration in each case, but each court's
reasoning and approach differ greatly. Examination of these cases may enable
generalities to be drawn and lessons to be learned about local regulation of
hydraulic fracturing in the United States.
These cases play out the tension between local and state governments
over which should primarily regulate hydraulic fracturing. These battles have
99
been fought before, for example, with respect to the siting of wind turbines
and land application of biosolids. 100 Most litigation involving state versus local
control involves the doctrine of preemption. The United States Supreme Court
has developed a typology of preemption that recognizes three types: express,
field, and conflict. 10' Most state courts also recognize preemption of local
ordinances by implication. 10 2 This Article, however, will not focus on
preemption issues, but instead examines the appropriate roles of state and local
governments.
B. Colorado Oil and Gas Association v. City of Longmont
Several plaintiffs filed suit against the City of Longmont, alleging that
a ban on hydraulic fracturing adopted by the city was preempted by the

99
See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE §§ 80.50.010-904; Residents Opposed to Kittitas Turbines v.
State Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council, 197 P.3d 1153 (Wash. 2008) (en banc).
100
See, e.g., Franklin Cnty. v. Fieldale Farms Corp., 507 S.E.2d 460 (Ga. 1998).

1o1 See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992); English v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990).
102
Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical
Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 266 (2000).
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Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act.10 3 The plaintiffs included the
Colorado Oil and Gas Association ("COGA"), an association of oil and gas
operators and the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission ("COGCC"
or the "Commission"), a statewide agency created by the Colorado Oil and Gas
10 4
Conservation Act ("the Act") to regulate oil and gas activity in the state.
Finally, TOP Operating Company ("TOP"), an oil and gas operating company
with principal holdings in or adjoining the City of Longmont, was also a
details the case law on preemption with respect to oil
plaintiff. 10 5 The opinion
10 6
and gas in the state.
The Act creates the COGCC 10 7 and provides for the appointment of a
director for the Commission. 1 8 The statutory provisions give the Commission,
inter alia, the authority to "make and enforce rules, regulations, and orders
pursuant to" the Act. 10 9 The Act seeks "balanced development" of oil and gas
"consistent with protection of public health, safety, and welfare," including
declares that the Act aims
protection of the environment.110 The legislature also
12
to prevent waste'11 and protect correlative rights.'
A 1990 Court of Appeals decision found that the Act completely
preempted local land use regulation of oil and gas activity. 1 3 The Colorado
Supreme Court reversed. 1 l4Instead of preempting all aspects of a county's land
use authority with respect to oil and gas, some local regulatory authority
remains in the state. The state exclusively regulates the technical aspects of oil
1 15
and gas development, preventing waste and protecting correlative rights. '
However,
[t]he state's interest in oil and gas activities is not so patently
dominant over a county's interest in land-use control, nor are

103

COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-101 (2014).

104

Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n v. City of Longmont, No. 13CV63, 2014 WL 3690665 (Colo. Dist.

Ct. July 24, 2014) (The Sierra Club; Earthworks; Our Health, Our Future, Our Longmont; and
Food and Water Watch were Defendants-Intervenors.).
105

Id.

106

Id.

107

COLO. REv. STAT. § 34-60-104(1) (2014).

1
109

Id. § 104.5(1).
Id. § 105(1).

110

Id. § 102(1)(a)(I).

1j1

Id. § 102(1)(a)(II).
Id. § 102(1)(a)(III).

112
113
114

Bowen/Edwards Assocs., Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 812 P.2d 656 (Colo. App. 1990).
Bd. of Cnty. Comn'rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., Inc., 830 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Colo. 1992)

(en banc).
115
Id. at 1058.
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the respective interests of both the state and the county so
irreconcilably in conflict, as to eliminate by necessary
implication any prospect
for a harmonious application of both
1
regulatory schemes. 6
The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether an
operational conflict existed after the evidence had been fully developed."17 The
court gave guidance to the trial court, stating:
We hasten to add that there may be instances where the county's
regulatory scheme conflicts in operation with the state statutory
or regulatory scheme. For example, the operational effect of the
county regulations might be to impose technical conditions on
the drilling or pumping of wells under circumstances where no
such conditions are imposed under the state statutory or
regulatory scheme, or to impose safety regulations on land
restoration requirements contrary to those required by state law
or regulation. To the extent that such operational conflicts might
exist, the county regulations must yield to the state interest.' 18
On the same day that Board of County Commissioners of La Plata
County v. Bowen/Edwards Associates, Inc. was decided, the Colorado Supreme
Court issued an opinion on another ban, this time involving a Home Rule
city. 1 9 The Colorado Constitution grants Home Rule cities "the full right of
self-government in both local and municipal matters."' 120 Home Rule city
ordinances "supersede within the territorial limits ... any law of the state in
conflict therewith.' ' 21 In addition, the Home Rule Amendment expressly states
that "the enumeration herein of certain powers shall not be construed to deny
such cities and towns, and to the people 'thereof,
any right or power essential or
22
proper to the full exercise of such right."'
The court first laid
out the state's preemption doctrine as to "matter[s]
1 23
of purely local concern."
It is a well-established principle of Colorado preemption
doctrine that in a matter of a purely local concern an ordinance
of a home-rule city supersedes a conflicting state statute, while

116

Id. (citations omitted).

"

Id. at 1060.

118

Id.

119

Voss v. Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Colo. 1992).

120

COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.

121

Id.

122

Id. § 6(h).

123

Voss, 830 P.2d at 1066.
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in a matter of purely statewide concern a state statute or
regulation supersedes a conflicting ordinance of a home-rule
city. Our case law, however, has recognized that municipal
legislation is not always a matter of exclusive local or
is often a matter of concern to
statewide concern but, rather,
1 24
both levels of government[.]
The test in Colorado for determining state preemption involves four
factors: "[1] whether there is a need for statewide uniformity of regulation; [2]
whether the municipal regulation has an extraterritorial impact; [3] whether the
subject matter is one traditionally governed by state or local government; and
specifically commits the particular
[4] whether the Colorado Constitution
125
matter to state or local regulation."
The Colorado Supreme Court found that the ordinance was preempted
by state law.
Because oil and gas pools do not conform to the boundaries of
local government, Greeley's total ban on drilling within the
city limits substantially impedes the interest of the state in
fostering the efficient development and production of oil and
gas resources in a manner that prevents waste and that furthers
the correlative rights of owners and producers in a common
pool or source of supply to a just and equitable share of profits.
In so holding, we do not mean to imply that Greeley is
prohibited from exercising any land-use authority over those
which oil and gas activities are occurring or
areas of the city in
1 26
are contemplated.

127
Notably, the court distinguished a "total ban" from mere regulation.
A 2002 Colorado Court of Appeals decision considered a town
ordinance that required a special permit for oil and gas drilling.1 28 The permit
"requirements included specific provisions for well location and setbacks, noise
mitigation, visual impacts and aesthetics regulation, and the like." 129 The Court
of Appeals granted summary judgment, finding some provisions of the
ordinance in operational conflict with state rules, but finding some provisions

124

Id. (citations omitted).

125

Id. at 1067 (citation omitted).

126

Id. at 1068.

127

128

Id. at 1069 (emphasis in original).
Town of Frederick v. N. Am. Res. Co., 60 P.3d 758, 760 (Colo. App. 2002).

129

Id.
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valid. 130 Specifically, regulations on "above-ground structures, access roads,
13

and emergency response costs" were not preempted. 1
The Court of Appeals, citing Voss, also distinguished a ban from
regulation.
If a home-rule city, instead of imposing a total ban on all
drilling within the city, enacts land-use regulations applicable
to various aspects of oil and gas development and operations
within the city, and if such regulations do not frustrate and can
be harmonized with the development and production of oil and
gas in a manner consistent with the stated goals of the Oil and
Gas Conservation Act, the city's regulations should be given
effect. "32
The court also cited Bowen/Edwards:
[T]he efficient and equitable development and production of
oil and gas resources within the state requires uniform
regulation of the technical aspects of drilling, pumping,
plugging, waste
prevention,
safety precautions,
and
environmental restoration. Oil and gas production is closely
tied to well location, with the result that the need for uniform
regulationextends also to the location and spacingof wells. 3' 3
Relying on this language, the Court of Appeals distinguished between technical
aspects of drilling, solely governed by state law, and nontechnical aspects,
1 34
which may be subject to local regulation.
Laying out a test of sorts, the court concluded that "although the
Town's process may delay drilling, the ordinance does not allow the Town to
prevent it entirely or to impose arbitrary conditions that would materially
35
impede or destroy the state's interest in oil and gas development."'
Considering these precedents, the trial court found that Longmont's ban
contradicted state regulation by causing waste. 136 The court noted that
Longmont essentially acknowledged that the ordinance at issue infringed upon
state regulatory authority, but argued that the state agency was failing to

130

Id. at 764.

131

Id.

132

Id. at 762 (quoting Voss, 830 P.2d at 1068-69).

133 Id. at 763 (en banc) (emphasis in original) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of La Plata
Cnty. v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., Inc., 830 P.2d 1045, 1058 (Colo. 1992)).
0i4

135

Id.
Id. at 766.

136 Colo. Oil &

Gas Ass'n. v.City of Longmont, No. 13CV63, 2014 WL 3690665, at *13-14

(Colo. Dist. Ct. July 24, 2014).
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137
adequately regulate hydraulic fracturing in the opinion of the city. The court
granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and enjoined Longmont from
ban, but it stayed the order pending appeal by the City of
enforcing the
38
Longmont. 1
In conclusion, the Colorado District Court, relying on a body of
precedent in that state, found that the Longmont ordinance conflicted with the
state statutes and regulations.' 39 This conflict is "obvious and patent on its
face."'140 The court found that a ban, as opposed to regulation, fails to prevent
4
waste and protect correlative rights.' ' Uniformity in regulation of hydraulic
fracturing is desirable, and the impacts of hydraulic fracturing are not purely
local.
42

C. In re Wallach v. Town of Dryden1

In contrast to Colorado jurisprudence, the Court of Appeals of New
York dismissed arguments that a ban frustrates state concerns and that
uniformity is desirable. The court held that towns in that state may ban oil and
gas production through local zoning because the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining
Law (OGSML) 143 does not preempt Home Rule authority to regulate land use.
fracturing, one
This case involved a combined appeal of two bans on hydraulic
144
Middlefield.
of
Town
the
by
one
and
by the Town of Dryden
New York's Home Rule provisions give every local government broad
authority to enact any local laws, requiring only that the laws be consistent with
the provisions of the state constitution and state statutes. 145 In addition, the state
legislature may restrict local authority.' 46 The Consolidated Laws of New York,
Chapter 62, Article 16, provides enabling authority to towns for planning and
zoning. Specifically, towns are authorized, inter alia, to regulate "the location
and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other
purposes."'

147

137

Id. at*11-12.

'3

Id. at *14.

'3

Id. at 13-14.
Id. at *14.
Id. at *13-14.

140
141

142

16 N.E.3d 1188 (N.Y. 2014).

143

N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-1901 (McKinney 2014).

144
145

In re Wallach, 16 N.E.3d at 1192, 1193.
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(ii).

146

Id.

N.Y. TowN LAW § 261 (McKinney 2014); see also N.Y. MUN. HoME RULE LAW § 10.6
(Consol. 2014).
147
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The Dryden ordinance at issue prohibits all oil and gas exploration,
extraction and storage activities. 148 In adopting the amendment, the town board
asserted that such activity would, inter alia, "endanger the health, safety and
general welfare of the community through the deposit of toxins into the air,
soil, water, environment, and the bodies of residents.,, 149 The Dryden ordinance
additionally prohibits "[n]atural [g]as and/or [p]etroleum [s]upport
[a]ctivities."' 150 Natural gas and/or petroleum support activities include
[t]he construction, use, or maintenance of a storage or staging
yard, a water or fluid injection station, a water or fluid
gathering station, a natural gas or petroleum storage facility, or
a natural gas or petroleum gathering line, venting station, or
compressor associated with the exploration or extraction of
natural gas or petroleum. 5'
Further, the provisions purport to invalidate any local, state or federal permits
that would allow a prohibited activity. 152 In contrast, the Middlefield ordinance
at issue simply states that "[h]eavy
industry and all oil, gas or solution mining
53
and drilling are prohibited uses."'
The power to regulate land use is "[a]mong the most important powers
and duties granted... to a town government" in New York.' 5 4 However, this
authority may not be used to enact regulations that conflict with state law. 55
The OGSML, like the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act, seeks to prevent
waste and protect correlative rights, among other purposes. 56 Notably, the
OGSML strives to "provide for the operation and development of oil and gas
properties in such a manner that a greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas may
be had.' ' 157 The provisions of the Act address drilling, casing, operation and

148

See

DRYDEN,

N.Y.,

ZONING

LAW

art.

V,

§

502

(2012),

available

at

http://dryden.ny.us/Planning-Department/ZoningLaw/Zoning-Ordinance-Amendmentsadoptedc7 19.2012.pdf.
149 In re Wallach, 16 N.E.3d at 1192.
150

DRYDEN, N.Y., ZONING LAW art. V, § 502(d).

151

Id. at art. III.

152

Id. at art. V, § 502(e).

153
See MIDDLEFIELD, N.Y., ZONING LAW art. V, § A (2011), available at
http://www.middlefieldny.com/uploads/1/2/6/8/12682437/zoning-law_061411_201 1_final.pdf.
154
N.Y. TOWN LAW § 272-a(1)(b) (McKinney 2014); see also DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of
N.Y., 749 N.E.2d 186, 191 (N.Y. 2001).
155
N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW §§ 10.l(i)-(ii) (Consol. 2013); Albany Area Builders Ass'n v.
Town of Guilderland, 546 N.E.2d 920, 922 (N.Y. 1989).
156
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2014).
157

Id.
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other technical aspects of extraction. 1 58 Among other provisions, the
' 59 Act
addresses well spacing "to promote efficient drilling and prevent waste."'
The clause relating to preemption states that the OGSML "supercede[s]
all local laws or ordinances relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution
mining industries; but shall not supersede local government jurisdiction over
or the rights of local governments under the real property tax
local 16roads
0
law."
The court relied heavily on the decision in In re Frew Run Gravel
Products, Inc. v. Town of Carroll.16 ' That decision distinguished between local
regulations addressing "the actual operation and process of mining" and land
"where" the
use regulations.1 62 In other words, local governments may regulate
63
activity takes place, but not "how" the activity is conducted.
Although the "how" versus "where" distinction is valid, Frew Run
appears to be wrongly decided. The Supreme Court for Livingston County, in a
case that involved the same preemption clause as Wallach, reluctantly found
that the local ordinance was not preempted, opining that Frew Run is "flawed,"
but feeling bound by the decision. 164 The statutory provision at issue in Frew
Run excepted local laws imposing stricter reclaimation standards from the
supercession clause.
"For the purposes stated herein, this title shall supersede all
other state or local laws relating to the extractive mining
industry; provided, however, that nothing in this title shall be
construed to prevent any local government from enacting local
zoning ordinances or other local laws which impose stricter
standards or requirements than those
mined land reclamation
' 165
found herein."
The fact that land reclamation was expressly subject to tighter
zoning controls by municipalities should have led to the
conclusion that extractive mining operations were not. But that

158

Id. § 23-0305(8).

159 In re Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1199 (N.Y. 2014) (citing N.Y. ENVTL.
CONSERV. LAW § 23-0503).
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303(2).
160
161 See In re Wallach, 16 N.E.3d at 1195-202 (relying heavily on In re Frew Run Gravel
Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1987)).
162 Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 923.
163
In re Wallach, 16 N.E.3d at 1196 (citing Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 922).
164
Lenape Res., Inc. v. Town of Avon, No. 1060-2012, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 15, 2013),
available at http://www.nysba.org/workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=43604.
165 In re Wallach, 16 N.E.3d at 1195-96 (emphasis omitted) (quoting N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAW

§ 23-0703(2)).
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is not what the Court of Appeals held, and its interpretation of
the primary clause of the statute in Frew Run is strong
persuasive precedent .... 166
The statute at issue in Frew Run was amended in 1991167 to essentially
codify the court's holding in the case as to preemption. The applicable
provision now reads:
2. For the purposes stated herein, this title shall supersede all
other state and local laws relating to the extractive mining
industry; provided, however, that nothing in this title shall be
construed to prevent any local government from:
a. enacting or enforcing local laws or ordinances of general
applicability, except that such local laws or ordinances shall
not regulate mining and/or reclamation activities regulated by
state statute, regulation, or permit; or
b. enacting or enforcing local zoning ordinances or laws which
determine permissible uses in zoning districts. Where mining is
designated a permissible use in a zoning district and allowed
by special use permit, conditions placed on such special use
permits shall be limited to the following:
(i) ingress and egress to public thoroughfares controlled by the
local government;
(ii) routing of mineral transport vehicles on roads controlled by
the local government;
(iii) requirements and conditions as specified in the permit
issued by the department under this title concerning setback
from property boundaries and public thoroughfare rights-ofway natural or man-made barriers to restrict access, if required,
dust control and hours of operation, when such requirements
and conditions are established pursuant to [the mining permit
provisions of this statute] of this title;
(iv) enforcement of reclamation requirements contained
in
68
mined land reclamation permits issued by the state[.]

166 Lanape, No. 1060-2012, at *4.
1991 N.Y. SESS. LAWS Ch. 166 § 228 (McKinney 2014).
168 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERVE. LAW § 23-2703(2).
167
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The court in Wallach applied the three pronged test from Frew Run,
examining the plain language of the statute, the statutory scheme, and
legislative history. Considering these factors, the court found that the local bans
in question are not preempted. 169 In contrast to the court's decision in Colorado
Oil and Gas Association v. City of Longmont, the Wallach opinion rejected the
notion that a ban conflicted with the state's goals of preventing waste and
promoting greater production. 170 The court similarly dismissed the assertion
that the statute's provisions relating to well spacing (a typical zoning provision)
indicated any intent to preempt local zoning regulations171
The holding in Wallach arguably stands on an even shakier foundation
than Frew Run. The provision in Frew Run referred to local zoning ordinances,
albeit in a limited context. The supercession provision in the OGSML excepts
only "local government jurisdiction over local
72 roads or the rights of local
governments under the real property tax law."'
Another issue in Wallach revolved around whether a distinction exists
between zoning ordinances that allow an activity in some parts of the
community, but not in others, and a total ban. 173 The majority opinion, citing
Gernatt, found no distinction. The dissent attempted to distinguish Gernatt,
which involved an ordinance that eliminated mining as a permitted use
throughout the town.
The ordinances here, however, do more than just "regulate land
use generally," they purport to regulate the oil, gas and solution
mining activities within the respective towns, creating a
blanket ban on an entire industry without specifying the zones
where such uses are prohibited. In light of the language of the
zoning ordinances at issue-which go into great detail
concerning the prohibitions against the storage of gas,
petroleum exploration and production materials and equipment
in the respective towns-it is evident that they go above and
beyond zoning and, instead, regulate those industries, which is
exclusively within the purview of the Department of
prohibition of
Environmental Conservation. In this fashion,
74
certain activities is, in effect, regulation.
Justice Pigott's distinction remains unclear, however. In Gernatt,
mining was allowed in all zoning classifications in the town under the 1969

170

In re Wallach, 16 N.E.3d at 1201.
Id. at 1199.

171

Id.

172

N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303(2).

173

In re Wallach, 16 N.E.3d at 1202.
In re Wallach, 16 N.E.3d at 1203-04 (Pigott, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

169

174
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zoning ordinance, with Town Board approval of the site. 175 Approval was
conditioned on consideration of whether the activity would constitute a
nuisance and on the operator's restoration plan.176 Amendments adopted in
1993 resulted in the prohibition of future mining throughout the town, with
existing operations continuing as nonconforming uses. 177 The court in Gernatt
directly addressed the issue of whether the prohibition of mining in all zoning
districts was distinguishable from an ordinance that prohibited mining in some
zoning districts. 178 The holding finds that municipalities have no obligation to
allow mining "somewhere" within the municipality. 179 Gernatt also involved a
claim of exclusionary zoning. The court summarily concluded
that exclusionary
80
zoning did not apply to exclusion of industrial uses.1
In conclusion, the Court of Appeals of New York rejected any notion
that bans are distinguishable from reasonable local regulation. The supercession
clause was narrowly construed to apply to very little local regulation. The court
stressed the importance of zoning as a local government power.
D. Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania'

81

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania used sweeping language in
Robinson to express many of the same sentiments as the Court of Appeals of
New York, 82 but in a case that offered the flipside of a preemption challenge.
Robinson involved numerous constitutional challenges to Pennsylvania Act 13
of 2012 ("Act 13").183 Pertinent to this discussion, Chapter 33 of Act 13184 set
out a uniform system of regulation throughout the state, requiring uniformity
among local zoning ordinances in the state with respect to oil and gas
development. 85 Most notably, Act 13 required that local governments allow oil
and gas development as of right throughout their communities. 86 However, the
provisions also imposed setback and other requirements. The court found that
Chapter 33 violated Section 27 of the Declaration of Rights of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, which provides as follows:
175 In re Gematt Asphalt Prods. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226, 1230 (N.Y. 1996).

178

id.
Id.
Id. at 1234-35.

179

Id. at 1235.

180

Id. at 1235-36.

181

83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).

182

See supra Part IV.C.

176
177

183 See Robinson, 83 A.3d at 913; see also 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2301 (2014).
184 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3301.
185
186

Robinson, 83 A.3d at 915.
See 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3304(b)(5).
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The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values
of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are
the common property of all the people, including generations
yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth
and maintain them for the benefit of all
shall conserve
87
people.

The court found that permitting oil and gas development in every
zoning district could not, as a matter of law, conserve and protect the
environment as required in Section 27 of the Declaration of Rights. 188 In
addition, Chapter 33 requires some properties and communities to bear a
heavier environmental burden than others. 189 Finally, the court concluded that
Chapter 33 violated the Commonwealth's duties under the public trust created
under Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 9 0 Notably,
Pennsylvania uses Dillon's Rule.1 9' Thus, Justice Saylor's dissenting opinion
rightfully pointed out that the plurality seems to reverse the roles of the state
and local governments, ignoring the fact that local governments derive their
powers solely from the state. 192 The Saylor dissent also characterized the
plurality as "hypothesizing" about the negative impacts of Act 13 on the
environment, while ignoring the detailed requirements of Act 13.193 For
oil and gas operations in
example, the requirements of Act 13 make locating
94
residential neighborhoods virtually impossible. 1
Justice Eakin joined in Justice Saylor's dissent and submitted a
separate dissenting opinion. Eakin's dissent reiterated the inconsistency
between the plurality's opinion and settled law on the relationship between
stated that "the bottom line is
state and local governments. 195 Justice Eakin
' 96
this-the gas in question will be extracted."'
In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania seemingly flipped
Dillon's Rule on its head, finding that the state cannot infringe upon a local
government's planning and zoning regime by requiring that hydraulic
187 PA. CONST. art. I,§ 27.
188 Robinson, 83 A.3d at 979.
189

Id. at 980 (noting that existing zoning regimes often place a heavier burden on some

citizens and communities than others, and discussing these issues under the rubrics of
environmental justice, exclusionary zoning, and others).
190
Id. at 981-82.
191 See supra Part II.A (discussing Dillon's Rule).
dissenting).
192 See Robinson, 83 A.3d at 1010-12 (Saylor, J.,
193 Id. at 1011.
194 See id.
195
196

dissenting).
Id. at 1014-15 (Eakin, J.,
Id. at1015.
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fracturing be allowed in all zoning classifications. This conclusion stands even
though the state legislature must enable local governments to plan and zone,
but nevertheless may prohibit local governments from enacting zoning
ordinances. Instead of examining whether the local ban was inconsistent with
state regulations, the court used a constitutional provision to find that state law
unreasonably infringed on local perogatives.
E. Northeast Natural Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown

97

The circuit court decision in Morgantown represents a more traditional
approach to the issues than the opinion in Robinson. In June 2011, the city of
Morgantown, West Virginia, passed an ordinance banning hydraulic fracturing
within city limits and within a one-mile radius of the city. 198 Northeast Natural

Energy, LLC and Enrout Properties, LLC filed suit, claiming that the ordinance
was preempted by West Virginia Code section 22-1-1, and the regulations
promulgated thereunder. Although not cited by the court, West Virginia's
regulatory regime for oil and gas, like the regulations of Colorado and New
York, seek to, inter alia, prevent waste and protect correlative rights. 199 The
Secretary of the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection 2 00is
given "full charge of the oil and gas matters" set out in West Virginia law.

The West Virginia legislature also declared that the state holds the primary
responsibility for protecting the environment. 20 1 "[O]ther government
entities ... have the primary responsibility of supporting the state in its role as
protector of the environment., 20 2 The state environmental program is intended
to be "comprehensive. 2 3
The city asserted that West Virginia's Home Rule provisions 2 4 granted
the city authority to enact the ban, characterizing hydraulic fracturing as a
nuisance. 20 5 The West Virginia Constitution authorizes municipalities in the
state to pass ordinances related to municipal affairs, so long as those ordinances
are consistent with, and do not conflict with, the state constitution and state

'97

No. 11-C-411,2011 WL3584376(Cir. Ct. W.Va. Aug. 12,2011).

198
MORGANTOWN, W. VA., ORDINANCE art. 721.01 (June 21, 2011), available at
http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/Frack ActionsMorgantownWV-ban.pdf, repealed
by MORGANTOWN, W. VA., ORDINANCE art. 12-33 (July 3, 2012).
199
W. VA. CODER. § 39-1-1(1.1) (2014).
201

W. VA. CODE
W. VA. CODE

202

Id.

200

§ 22-6-2(c) (2014).
§ 22-1-1(a)(2).

W. VA. CODE § 22-1-1(b)(3).
W. VA. CODE § 8-12-2.
205
Ne. Natural Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 11-C-411, 2011 WL 3584376, at *2,
*8 (Cir. Ct. W. Va. Aug. 12, 2011).
203
204
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laws.2 °6 This provision is codified in two separate places in the West Virginia
Code. The statute laying out Home Rule authority for all cities includes the
provision,20 7 as well as the grant of general powers to all municipalities.20 8
Most pertinent to the Morgantown ordinance at issue, municipalities may
"provide for the elimination of hazards to public health and safety and to abate
or cause to be abated anything which in the opinion of a majority of the
governing body is a public nuisance. '20 9
The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding that the
West Virginia Oil and Gas ACt210 constituted a "comprehensive regulatory
scheme with no exception carved out for a municipal corporation to act in
conjunction with the [West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection]
pursuant to the Home Rule provision.' 2 1 1 Applying Dillon's Rule,212 the court
found that the city lacked authority to enact and enforce the ban.213 In addition,
state law holds that where the state and local governments enact regulations
on
214
a certain matter, the state regulation controls where inconsistencies exist.
The city missed the filing deadline for appealing the case.215 However,
Morgantown amended its zoning ordinance to specifically regulate hydraulic
fracturing ("extractive industry use") in July 2012.216 The requirements add to
the general requirements for heavy industry. The ordinance prescribes a
minimum lot size of five acres for oil and gas extraction 217 and a 625 foot
setback from any residential zone, and the property boundary of any dwelling
unit located in other than a residential zone, church, school, day care facility, or
park. 2 18 The activity must be setback at least 100 feet from any 100-year
floodplain, 1,000 feet from a public water intake, and 1,000 feet from the 100-

VI, § 39.

206

W. VA. CONST. art.

207
208

W. VA. CODE § 8-12-2 (2014).
W. VA. CODE § 8-12-5.

209

W. VA. CODE § 8-12-5(23).

210

W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6 to -10.
Ne. Natural Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 11 -C-411, 2011 WL 3584376, at *6

211

(Cir. Ct. W. Va. Aug. 12, 2011).
212
See supra Part II.A (discussing Dillon's Rule).
213
Ne. NaturalEnergy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *7.
214

Id. at *7-8 (citing Davidson v. Shoney's Big Boy Rest., 380 S.E.2d 232, 235 (W. Va.

1989)).
215
Local Bans on Hydraulic FracturingUpheld in New York State, Struck Down in West
Virginia, MARTEN
LAW
(Apr.
10, 2012)
(footnote
omitted), available at
http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/2012041 0-local-hydraulic-fracturing-bans#_ednrefl 7.
216
MORGANTOWN, W. VA. PLANNING & ZONING CODE ch. 1, art. 1355.08(C) (2012), available
at http://www.morgantownwv.gov/wp-content/uploads/Planning-and-Zoning-Code-2012.pdf
217
Id. art. 1355.08(C)(1).
218
Id. art. 1355.08(C)(2)(a)-(b).
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year floodplain of the Monongahela River south or upstream of the
Morgantown Lock and Dam.219
A variance may be granted reducing the setbacks to no less than 300
feet for any dwelling unit not located in a residential zone, church, school, day
care facility, or park.22 ° Other provisions address signage,22' fresh water
impoundment,222 secondary containment,2 23 waste disposal,224 gas emission and
burning, 225 security,22 6 cleanup and maintenance, 227 and site restoration. 228 This
ordinance has not yet been challenged.
The City of Morgantown, rebuffed in its attempt at banning hydraulic
fracturing, turned instead to a traditional zoning ordinance. Although the
ordinance has not been challenged, existing case law indicates that the
ordinance would be upheld. This result likely holds regardless of whether a
close examination of the circumstances in the city indicates that the ordinance
creates a de facto ban.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

Recent case law on local control of hydraulic fracturing provides both
models and extremes. Specifically, New York and Pennsylvania provide the
extremes. In New York, the court allowed a local government to ban activity
that the state allows.2 29 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, rejected an
allow oil and
attempt by the state legislature to mandate that local governments
232
2 31
230
gas production in all zoning classifications. West Virginia and Colorado
appear to be in the mainstream of jurisprudence, allowing reasonable regulation
of oil and gas production, consistent with state regulation. As state courts and
state legislators attempt to provide a clearer line between state and local

219

220

Id. art. 1355.08(C)(2)(a)-(e).
Id. art. 1355.08(C)(3).

225

Id. art. 1355.08(C)(4).
Id. art. 1355.08(C)(5).
Id. art. 1355.08(C)(6).
Id. art. 1355.08(C)(7).
Id. art. 1355.08(C)(8).

226

Id. art. 1355.08(C)(9).

227

Id. art. 1355.08(C)(10).
Id. art. 1355.08(C)(11).

221

222
223
224

228
229

230
231

See, e.g., In re Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188 (N.Y. 2014).
See, e.g., Robinson Twp. v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
See, e.g., Ne. Natural Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 11-C-411, 2011 WL

3584376 (Cir. Ct. W. Va. Aug. 12, 2011).
232
Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n v. City of Longmont, No. 13CV63, 2014 WL 3690665 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. July 24, 2014).
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authority to regulate oil and gas activities, the history of zoning regulation and
other state and federal regulations prove instructive.
, Although existing case law provides little guidance, traditional areas of
state control and traditional objectives of zoning may provide some hints for
local governments that desire to lawfully and reasonably regulate hydraulic
fracturing. The following activities clearly lie within the state's authority: onsite drilling, oversight of the chemicals used and the production process,
prevention of waste, protection of correlative rights, conservation of oil and gas
natural resources, safety, and on-site contamination.2 33 The majority of state
regulations address these issues.
Local regulation encompasses noise, light and other visual impacts,
road damage, blasting, dust, traffic, compatibility of the activity to nearby
property uses, impact of the activity on property values in the area, adequate
off-site infrastructure, adequate services (such as police and fire protection),
affordable housing, the general health, the safety of the community, odors,
potential groundwater
contamination,
methane
emissions,
habitat
fragmentation, and degradation of environmentally sensitive areas.234 These
local government concerns coincide with traditional zoning regulation.
State statutes should also clearly set out the parameters of preemption.
The Federal Telecommunications Act provides a possible model. The Act
clearly sets out the intent of the legislature. Courts have had to further define
state and local versus federal roles, but the clear guidelines of the statute
arguably have produced logical and predictable court rulings. However, state
legislatures possess the authority to overturn state court decisions that fail to
recognize legislative intent. The New York legislature essentially affirmed the
Frew Run decision by incorporating the ruling into state statute. However, even
that statute placed limits on local government zoning.
Although the New York court's distinction between "where" and
"how" 235 provides a good general guideline for determining state versus local
authority, a finer distinction must be drawn. Determination of "where" should
not include "nowhere," invoking a ban on the activity in the community. Bans
defeat the state intentions to prevent waste and protect correlative rights. The
prohibition on bans, de facto or otherwise, in the Federal Telecommunications
Act ensure that federal objectives are achieved. A similar prohibition with
respect to hydraulic fracturing in state statutes would promote state objectives
for oil and gas development.

233

See Freilich & Popowitz, supra note 9, at 533, 535, 543, 547.

234

San Pedro Mining Corp. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Santa Fe Cnty., 909 P.2d 754, 759

(N.M. Ct. App. 1995); see also 3 SALKIN, supra note 27, § 18.59; Freilich & Popowitz, supra

note 9, at 535; Ritchie, supra note 26, at 8,40, 89.
235

See In re Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1196 (N.Y. 2014) (citing I re

Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920, 922 (1987)).
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Like objections to cellular towers, some objections to hydraulic
fracturing fail to find solid grounding in fact. The Supreme Court in Robinson,
at least in the view of the dissent, "hypothesized" about negative impacts of
hydraulic fracturing, instead of basing its decision on facts. The Federal
Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires decisions on the siting of cellular
towers be based on "substantial evidence." A similar requirement for local land
use decisions on hydraulic fracturing operations would prevent hypothesizing.
In any case, clearer guideposts for local governments would prevent or
reduce litigation and allow state objectives with respect to oil and gas
development to be achieved more readily. Pennsylvania Act 13 may have
overreached in that regard,23 6 but the Court of Appeals of New York appears to
have "under-reached" by allowing local governments to thwart state objectives
by banning an activity that the state declares as legal and productive. The
"balance" that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania cited so often, but appears to
have failed to implement, requires that state and local government regulation
complement and supplement each other, not battle each other for control. The
Colorado and West Virginia decisions more closely achieve this balance.
[L]ike it or not, the bottom line is this-the gas in question will
be extracted. It is going to be removed from the earth, and it is
going to be transported to refineries. The question
for our
23 7
legislature is not "if" this will happen, but "how.,

236
237

See generally Fershee, supra note 84.
Robinson Twp. v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 1015 (Pa. 2013) (Eakin, J., dissenting).
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